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 In his essay, the author refers to Jan Tinbergen and distinguishes positive from 
negative globalisation. Negative globalisation has been happening for the last two 
decades and is characterized by elimination of borders and bypassing the estab-
lished regulation. This process hasn't been accompanied by new regulation on a 
global level. In this way, democratic theory had to face the challenge of positive 
globalisation and building of new forms of responsibility, regulation and orienta-
tion of values. In order to rediscover democracy, it is necessary to call for prag-
matic utopian realism.  
 The author continues by presenting the overview of the different models of 
global democracy that are situated in different settings and are placed at different 
levels of political realism and achievability. Still, because of the unilateral action 
of the USA, this pragmatic utopian realism is of no real importance and it is only 
European Union and transnational political movements that can stand up against it. 
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  Globalisation: The State of Democracy 
 The current stage of the interconnected twin processes of modernization and 
globalisation is marked by a variety of alarming characteristics that threaten the norms 
and standards of liberal democracy. Though globalisation as such is an extremely com-
plex process that displays a variety of different and even contradictory features that by 
no means represent one directed tendency of development alone (Beck, 1997, 
Held/McGrew, 2000), some of its dimensions relate directly to the validity and reality 
of democracy. Most of those have been under discussion in political science and the 
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public since more than a decade (Held, 1995; 2000, Beck, 1998; Guehenno, 1999; Gid-
dens, 1990, 2001). Among many others the most outstanding of those elements of glob-
alisation that challenge the theory and threaten the reality of democracy directly are the 
following (Archibugi/Held/Köhler, 1998; Offe, 1999; Ruggie, 1999; Scharpf, 1999; 
Streeck, 1999; Held; 1995, 2000; Held/McGrew, 2000; McGrew, 1997, 2000; Meyer, 
2001b): 
• Whereas markets, environmental destruction, migration, organized crime, and elec-
tronic mass communication increasingly transgress all national boundaries, democ-
racy and our political capacity to act in order to tackle these and other pressing 
problems are in substance still restricted to the jurisdiction of the nation state. Thus, 
democracy itself tends to become more and more powerless and, consequently, 
questionable in its own core claims. 
• It was only the gradual cultural, social and ecological embedding of markets in the 
course of the late 19th and 20th century that have made capitalism in its various 
tamed forms more or less acceptable for democracy in Europe. But it is now exactly 
these conditions of being appropriately embedded that globalised markets are sub-
stantially stripped off. In addition national welfare states as the core parts of such 
democratic embedding come under increasing pressure as one of the external effects 
of economic globalisation in its present forms. Thus globalisation threatens to dis-
mantle the very foundations even of those historical compromises between capital-
ism and democracy that European societies had succeeded to strike in order to se-
cure their legitimacy.  
• Both economically-dominated globalisation and market-led modernization of pre-
sent day societies display a strong tendency to get more and more disconnected from 
basic human values and rights and the very preconditions for good life in most parts 
of the world. The shaping forces of this development lack guidance and orientation 
that could make them meet with the consent of the large majority of those whose 
lives are strongly affected by it. 
• In general, as David Held has put it: “In fact, in all major areas of government pol-
icy, the enmeshment of national political communities in regional and global proc-
esses involves them in intensive issues of transboundary coordination and control. 
Political space for the development and pursuit of effective government and the ac-
countability of political power is not longer coterminous with a delimited national 
territory”. What we are facing today is the new reality of “overlapping communities 
of fate” without a co-extensive overlapping of our polities (Held, 2000: 424).  
 In the terms of Jan Tinbergen we can say that in the course of the last two or so dec-
ades the world has passed through a prolonged period of largely negative globalisation 
which has been characterized in substance by tearing down boundaries and bypassing 
the established mechanisms of responsibility and regulation without building new ones 
at the global level that functionally could replace the old ones (Tinbergen, 1965). In 
terms of democratic theory the challenge thus posed is unambiguous: What is most ur-
gently needed are new trans-national institutions, procedures and policies to bring the 
unleashed forces of modernization and globalisation back under political, and moreover 
democratic control, render them amenable to political deliberation, the rule of basic hu-
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man values and political decision making power. On the agenda of democratic theory 
and practice is, therefore, a process of positive globalisation that proceeds by construct-
ing new forms of accountability, regulation and value orientation in order to render the 
two realms of political problem causation and democratic problem solving capacity 
again sufficiently coterminous.  
 
  A Crisis of Legitimacy 
 In both academic and political discussions of recent years it has become obvious that 
the present world order, or in many respects rather disorder, in increasing measures suf-
fers a risky lack of legitimacy. This legitimacy crises is, however, by no means re-
stricted to the realm of global politics. It affects likewise the internal condition of the 
national democracies irresistibly and increasingly because the global democracy deficit 
implies also their own incapability to keep major developments that affect the well-be-
ing of their citizens substantially under the control of their own jurisdiction. Both the 
lack of global democracy and the lack of effectiveness and reach of national democratic 
jurisdiction are just reverse sides of the same coin. One expressions of this being the 
growing protest movement particularly of younger people against the present mode of 
globalisation and its consequences for large parts of the world’s population both in the 
South and in the North of the globe.  
 Regarding the issue of legitimacy it is consensus today that modern age standards of 
political legitimacy require two basic norms to be respected as soon as it comes to 
binding political action:  
1) that all issues political in nature are to be dealt with in politically legitimate proce-
dures; 
2) that all such legitimate political procedures need to be based on the norms of human 
rights and democratic procedures. 
 Nineteenth and twentieth century concepts of democracy were based on the premise 
of co-extension between the twin arenas of political problem causation and political 
sovereignty of decision making (Held, 1995; 2000; Streeck, 1998). This was the widely 
accepted rationale of the idea of the democratic nation state. The nation state was ex-
pected to harmonize the three dimensions of a) the extension of the chains of political 
problem causation, b) the scope of addressees and b) the collective of authors of politi-
cal solutions for all those problems political in nature. In order to define what is politi-
cal in nature and what belongs to the realm of privacy two basic criteria emerged in the 
course of the 20th century (Meyer, 2002b):  
1) All social actions that lead to rules and regulations that are binding for all members 
of a given society so that no space is left for them to opt out must be considered to 
be political in nature. There are basically two forms of such binding social facts: 
laws, rules, public policy outcomes and public goods on the one hand and external 
effects of societal or economic activities on the other hand that entail some kind of 
coerced consumption that nobody can escape. 
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2) Wherever basic human rights of groups of individuals are affected by the actions of 
other groups or individuals there is a case for legitimate political intervention. Tho-
mas H. Marshall has demonstrated that the very idea of basic human rights cannot 
be restricted without severe contradictions to liberal rights (as freedom from ille-
gitimate state intervention) and political rights only (to participate in the process of 
political decision making) but needs to be extended to the sphere of preconditions 
for free action (social rights, social citizenship) (Marshall, 1992). Thus the concept 
of basic human rights today combines in a post-liberal manner the three dimensions 
of freedom from the state (liberal rights), freedom in the state (political rights) and 
freedom through the state (social rights). Wherever human rights in this post-liberal 
broad sense are systematically affected or violated by the external effects of societal 
or economic action democratic a political response is called for.  
 Hence, legitimate political action – action to which all citizens, wherever they may 
live, have a basic right as citizens – in the world of today is required in all cases in 
which the two defined conditions for matters political in nature are met. In terms of 
modern norms of legitimacy this is the mark that needs to be targeted by the process of 
positive globalisation. The challenge for both democratic theory and practice is to find 
out in which formal or informal, institutional and extra-institutional ways this challenge 
can be met. 
 In sum: societal, economic or political actions that either cause unavoidable social 
facts or affect the basic rights of people need to be tackled through legitimate political 
procedures. In that sense it can be argued, as many authors did, that in an era of global-
isation democracy needs to be reinvented. The often neglected point here, however, is 
that missing the mark of global democratisation implies a substantial measure of de-
valuating nation state and even regional state democracy was well, because in that case 
they will loose invariably their power of political jurisdiction. After the first two great 
historical transitions to democracy – first in some cities during antiquity in Greece and 
second in some cities during Renaissance in Italy – we are now facing a third historical 
stage of democratic transition – the globalisation of democracy (Held, 2000: 429; also 
Beck, 1998). Those chains of political effect-causation that transgress national bounda-
ries need trans-national arenas for deliberation for all those affected and trans-national 
procedures for decision making and enforcement (Höffe, 1999). The future of democ-
racy as such, not merely with respect to the legitimacy of the global order, is at stake.  
 
  Toward a New Utopian Realism. Competing Approaches to Global 
Democracy 
 Contrary to the position of the so-called realists in the field of foreign policy re-
search I would like to argue that reinventing democracy at a global scale is by no means 
empty utopianism but, as Anthony Giddens has put it, needful pragmatic utopian real-
ism. It is meaningful and necessary in order to provide guidelines for present day politi-
cal action that is pressed by the needs of the day and the obvious legitimacy deficits of 
the given situation (Giddens, 1990). Moreover, relevant parts of the blueprint for a po-
litically integrated world society are already visible in an embryonic way in present day 
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structures of trans-national political cooperation. They still do in their given shape, 
however, suffer from wide gaps, severe democratic deficits, unacceptable degrees of ex-
clusionism and heavy unfair biases.  
 In current academic discussions of the problem of global democratisation there is 
widespread consensus on a number of basic issues but also dissent on a variety of open 
questions concerning the design, the ways of implementation and the purposes of global 
democracy. There is certain consensus that co-extension of the twin arenas of political 
effect causation and accountable decision making sovereignty needs to be regained 
through new forms of transboundary democratic procedures. A comprehensive strategy 
of positive globalisation as a gradual construction of world wide institutions, organiza-
tions and regimes of political deliberation and decision making is called for. On the ba-
sis of these shared convictions a variety of different responses to the challenge of glob-
alising democracy have been advanced in recent years all of which claim to meet the 
mark of utopian realism in the sense that they demonstrate in normative terms what is 
both necessary and feasible in the globalised world of today.  
 Anthony McGrew distinguishes three, as he argues, clearly discernible models of 
global democracy: 1. Global Governance; 2. Demarchy; and 3. Cosmopolitan Democ-
racy. Yet, as a fourth model the approach of the Subsidiary World Republic should be 
added. It is sufficiently different from the first three, cogently argued and not without 
some influence on political thinking (e.g. in the German Social Democratic party’s po-
litical discourse). Each of these approaches is situated in a different tradition of political 
thought, entertains different ideals about the specific kind and role of required institu-
tions and problems to be solved, and pursues a different path in conceiving the very 
norms of democratic decision making themselves. It might be added that they also seem 
to represent quite different degrees of political realism and feasibility.  
 
 1. The Global Governance Approach 
 The Commission on Global Governance in 1995 has coined the brand-name Global 
Governance to designate the specific model of transboundary governance that it pro-
posed in its official report. This is a model of liberal-democratic internationalism that is 
marked by the following cluster of features:  
• A set of pluralistic arrangements by which states, international organizations, civil 
society initiatives, movements and networks, international regimes (such as the 
WTO) and markets combine to regulate or govern certain aspects of global affairs. 
• The proposed structures are not meant to work as fixed models and deliberately do 
not imply elements of world government or world federalism. 
• The elements of this design interact with each other in a multifaceted strategy 
according to the demands of particular transboundary political issues. 
• In order to make this process work the deliberate nurturing of a global civic ethic is 
topmost on the agenda. 
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• The effectiveness and inclusiveness of the United Nations and its sub-organisations 
needs to be enhanced. 
• The United Nations institutional system is to be complemented by new forms of de-
mocratic institutionalisation such as a People’s Assembly and a Global Civil Society 
Forum in which the world’s peoples are to be represented more directly. 
• An Economic Security Council is proposed to co-ordinate economic global governance.  
• A right of petition to the UN-institutions for individuals and groups is to be estab-
lished. 
• A common world-wide enforceable set of global rights and responsibilities is to be 
institutionalised both to materialize and to strengthen the concepts of global citizenship. 
• Regional systems of political co-operation like the EU, ASEAN, SAARC and the 
like need to be developed in all the world’s regions and build in their turn networks 
of political cooperation among themselves. 
• Citizens’s participation at all levels of global governance from the local through the 
national and regional to the global is to be enhanced.  
 This model draws upon the tradition of political liberalism by aiming to subject the 
present rule of arbitrary power to the rule of law within global society. It stresses strate-
gies of strengthening the representative and formal institutions of the UN. It is reformist 
in the sense that it pursues a strategy of incremental adaptation of the present embryonic 
structures of transboundary governance to the conditions of global accountability it pre-
scribes. Underlying seems to be the assumption that the political necessities in a glob-
alised world will drive forward the process of global governance through the irresistible 
power of their own weight.  
 McGrew classifies this model as a product of conventional liberalism for three 
different reasons: a) its inbuilt tensions between peoples sovereignty and state sover-
eignty in its concept of a people’s assembly attached to the intergovernmental body of 
the UN general assembly in an ambiguous manner; b) its stress on formal and represen-
tative structures of governance and c) its separation of the economic from the political 
by envisaging only a soft form of economic surveillance through the conceived eco-
nomic world council that would in effect entail a restriction of democracy to the politi-
cal sphere (McGrew, 2000: 410). Another strong point of criticisms here is that the 
model does not provide any solutions to the problem that growing global interdepend-
ence unavoidably also leads to increasing global conflict.  
  
 2. The Demarchy Approach 
 A model of positive globalisation that has been exactly designed by its authors in or-
der to overcome the perceived democratic deficits of the global governance approach is 
a communitarian concept of direct global democracy. It has been baptized by the au-
thors as “demarchy” (Burnheim, 1985; see also Barber, 1995.). This approach stresses 
that real democracy in the global arena no less that in the national arena will only be 
feasible to the degree to which it emerges directly from the life, experience and the con-
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ditions of particular communities. In the case of global democracy, however, the rele-
vant communities will not in the first instance be local communities bound to a particu-
lar territory, but increasingly transboundary communities of interest or affection such as 
environmental, religious, gender, human rights and the like.  
 The basic features of this model are: 
• The global construction of new forms of functional governance along the lines of 
particular policy arenas (environment, economy, trade, health, labour, gender, hu-
man rights, religion etc.). 
• Transboundary procedures of direct deliberation and decision making in the respec-
tive areas that are embedded in active communities of interest and affection. 
• No mediation of such decision making procedures through formalized representative 
political structures and bodies but direct accountability of the functional authorities 
to the affected communities. 
 “Democracy and democratic legitimacy are not to be thought in geographically-
bounded entities like nation–states, but rather in functional authorities of varying geo-
graphical scope run by individuals selected by lot from among those with a material in-
terest in the issue in question”(Dryzek, 1995).  
• Preference for republican modes of self-governance in all the special interest realms. 
• Creation of entirely new structures of democratic self-rule instead of transferring the 
problematic institutions of national democracy onto the global level. 
• Preference for identifying and clarifying the normative conditions for true global de-
mocracy rather than designing institutions and blueprints. 
• A revival of the polis-model of direct democracy along the new globalised lines of 
functional self-governance: management of the functional authority by committees 
that are chosen on the basis of a statistically representative sample from among the 
affected communities (even “by lot”). 
• Co-ordination between the various functional authorities not by nation-states or 
other territory-bound transnational institutions but through committees of represen-
tatives from among all the functional authorities. 
• The end of the nation-state and the very concept of political sovereignty. 
• Power politics as we knew it will entirely be replaced by the proliferation of those 
diverse, overlapping and spatially differentiated self-governing communities of fate 
with multiple sites of power. 
 The model seeks a radical change both in the intra-national and trans-national modes 
of governance directed towards direct democracy. At the level of theory building it 
draws on the long tradition of theories of direct democracy and republican self-govern-
ment. At the level of feasibility and political practices its hopes rest with the emergence 
and growth of new global social movements and citizens networks. The model is clearly 
biased in favour of normative demands trusting that patterns of success for action will 
emerge from the progress of practice itself rather than from preconceived theoretical de-
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signs. The hope is that the proposed modes of self-governance are apt to bring the 
global economy under the rule of direct democracy too, and thus engendering economic 
and social equality around the world. 
 The first questions to be raised here are those of realism (powerless politics) and 
feasibility (institutionless politics) (see below in the chapter on the limits of civil society 
politics).  
  
 3. The Cosmopolitan Democracy Approach 
 British political scientist David Held has forwarded a model of positive democratic 
globalisation which he calls in the tradition of I. Kant’s famous vision Cosmopolitan 
Democracy (Held, 1995,2000). This model is – like the demarchy approach – meant to 
overcome the democratic shortcomings of the global governance concept but be at the 
time of a more practical nature than the demarchy approach. It starts from stating the 
undeniable basic fact of the world of today that humankind now is bound together both 
morally and materially in a “politics of spaceship earth” and, because of that, is badly in 
need to draw the necessary political consequences from this new reality.  
 Held’s model is characterized by the following set of proposals: 
• Underlying the entire institutional design is the expectation that a republican ethic of 
democratic autonomy is emerging and will motivate people not to act on the basis of 
their individualistic self-interest but in a spirit of responsible citizenship. Democratic 
autonomy here is defined as self-determination by persons who understand them-
selves as part of a wider collectivity whose democratic rules enable and constrain 
their own actions (Held, 1995: 23). 
• Democratic practices thus need to be embedded within communities and civil 
associations but on this condition need to be globally extended trough networks of 
agencies and assemblies that cut across spatially delimited locales. 
• In striking difference to the demarchy model the approach of cosmopolitan democ-
racy aims at framing such civil society activities with a rather dense system of glob-
ally binding cosmopolitan democratic law that “transcends the particular claims of 
nations and states and extends to all in the ‘universal community’” (Held, 
1995:228). 
 Thereby the model in this respect is based on a very strong institutional element of 
genuine supra-nationalism. 
• Thus, both the informal political activities in the realm of transboundary communi-
ties and civil society politics on the one hand and in the realm of institutionalised 
national government policies on the other will have to take place in the shadow of 
binding cosmopolitan law. 
• Such cosmopolitan democratic law shall not be established through structures of a 
world government or a federal global super-state but by “a transnational, common 
structure of political action” embracing all levels of, and participants in, global gov-
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ernance, from states, multinational corporations, international institutions, social 
movements, to individuals (McGrew, 2000: 414).  
• Cosmopolitan sovereignty in this way is based on a post-Westphalian cluster of “a 
global and divided authority system – a system of diverse and overlapping power 
centres shaped and delimited by democratic law” (Held, 1995: 234). 
• This global authority structure is meant to be placed between federalism and 
confederalism as it combines the establishment of an overarching legal framework 
with self-governing political actors at all political levels. 
• Cosmopolitan democracy means the end of sovereign statehood and the concept of 
national citizenship. Both shall, henceforth, be related to and defined in the frame-
work of cosmopolitan democratic law. 
• Cosmopolitan citizenship here is, however, not tantamount to some form of entirely 
informal citizenship as in some concepts of post-modern citizenship (Faulks, 2000). 
It is instead understood as multiple citizenship that brings citizens under the juris-
diction of several authorities at various political levels of authority and entitles them 
to participate in the relevant decisions at each level (Linklater, 1996). 
• The establishment of cosmopolitan law itself is conceived to proceed through a 
reconstructed system of international organizations particularly a profoundly re-
formed UN-system. All these institutions need to be rendered more representative 
and more accountable by way of major reforms. 
• Functional transnational institutions such as the WTO, the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund shall be put under the control of elected supervisory 
boards. The UN-General Assembly would be complemented by a directly elected 
“Assembly of Peoples” that serves as a second chamber. Referenda by the world’s 
peoples would be added. 
• A global Human Rights Court would be put in place. 
• Regional systems of political co-operation would be expanded, enhanced and 
democratised. 
• The entrenchment of cosmopolitan law at all political levels would be guaranteed by 
the exercise of coercive force through new and accountable military structures at 
each level. 
• A final and most crucial point that distinguishes this approach from the global 
governance concept is the prospect that the global economy shall in some way be 
fully embedded into the structures of political accountability and decision making 
and open to political intervention. 
 This approach is meant as a deliberate synthesis from a variety of traditions of politi-
cal thought among which liberal democracy, direct democracy, communitarianism, and 
democratic republicanism figure most prominently (McGrew, 2000: 415). It aims at 
combining their respective virtues without sharing their flaws and shortcomings, be 
normatively most demanding and perfectly realistic at the same time. 
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 4. The Subsidiary World Republic Approach  
 Eminent German political philosopher Otfried Höffe most recently has developed a 
model of global democracy that with programmatic intention is termed the model of So-
cial and Subsidiary World Republic (Höffe, 1999). It is entirely based on normative 
considerations concerning the moral conditions of democracy in a globalised world. 
This approach has, surprisingly or not, met with remarkable resonance within the left 
wing of the Social Democratic Party in Germany. Though even this approach shares 
many of its features with most of the other models it is distinguished from all of them 
by its conspicuous stress on the imperative moral foundations of global democracy en-
tailing highly institutionalised patterns of statehood. The steps of the argument are as 
follows: 
• A highly interdependent world society in which everybody can always be affected in 
its rights and interests by the activities of everybody else irrespective of the location 
of either, necessitates the establishment of an enforceable universal law that protects 
everybody’s basic rights everywhere. 
• Universal law needs to be implemented and enforced by an impartial global author-
ity as a necessary condition in order to be effective at all. Without such a formal 
authority no sufficient validity of the law. 
• Such a global law-enforcing authority is only conceivable in terms of statehood 
characterized by institutions fit to exercise coercive power at all levels. Conse-
quently global statehood in a globalised world is a moral imperative that springs di-
rectly from the validity of basic moral norms and human rights. 
• As statehood under the cultural conditions of modernity necessarily needs to 
materialize in the forms of rights based democracy, a democratic world republic is 
the only morally appropriate and sufficient answer to the challenge of globalisation.  
• The democratic world republic should, however, not take the form of a homogenous 
body but be differentiated in levels and sectors according to the democratic princi-
ples of federalism and subsidiarity. This principles delegate and restrict decision 
making power to exactly those levels and branches of the global state where it will 
respectively meet best the conditions of effectiveness and participation of the most 
affected citizens. 
• A Subsidiary World Bank is to be linked to the global state structures and will have 
to exercise powers of surveillance and regulation over the world market. 
• Whereas health and education policies, e.g., will still remain the nation state’s 
responsibility, such policy areas as peace, ecological protection or the accountable 
regulation of the world market will be within the jurisdiction of the uppermost level 
of global sovereignty. 
• Under the umbrella of the compulsory structures of organized world statehood there 
will, nonetheless, be ample space for a colourful bunch of diverse agencies of state-
like or quasi-state-like character. 
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• The establishment of the new world republic can only be understood as a process of 
long duration. In order to support its progress it will be helpful to start with more 
modest forms of political confederalism and proceed only gradually toward fully-
fledged federalism.  
• The envisaged fundamental transformation of present time international political 
structures seems at the first sight to be rather utopian but will gradually proceed as it 
is driven by the superior force of moral necessity. Thus, the third democratic revo-
lution will finally prove to be without a serious and justifiable alternative and in that 
sense be an ultimately realistic approach. 
 Höffe’s model is constructed at the level of philosophical discourse and in its origins 
largely disconnected from both the political discussion and the discourse of political 
science in the relevant area. It is, nonetheless, cogently argued in terms of its own nor-
mative claims in the context of democratic theory and deserves thoroughgoing consid-
eration, particularly with respect to the normative foundations of positive globalisation 
and the long term prospects of political institution building. It is obviously not meant as 
a contribution to the current agenda of transnational policy making.  
 
 A Model of Open Transnational Co-ordination. Toward a Realistic 
Synthesis 
 For an assessment of the suitability of the competing models respective to the chal-
lenge of global democracy under the given political conditions the application of three 
criteria appears to be fit: 1) their normative sufficiency, 2) the appropriateness of their 
political design and 3) the pragmatic feasibility of their design in the world we know. In 
comparing the approaches with the three criteria of assessment in mind I would argue 
that none of the models as such but an Open Method of Global Co-ordination which 
synthesizes some of their features whilst rejecting or omitting deliberately some others 
would best serve the purpose of guiding the process of positive globalisation with a 
maximum of political support.  
 An Open Method of Global Co-ordination draws, firstly, upon the broad scope of 
consensus and overlapping among all reported models of global democratisation:  
• the basis analysis of the given situation: that both nation-state democracies and the 
global order are badly in need of some form of global democracy that is apt to bring 
about a new co-extension between transboundary political problems and political ac-
countability; 
• the concept of a new cosmopolitan citizenship that entitles and empowers citizens 
from all parts of the world to participate in political deliberation and decision mak-
ing at all level of politics in a globalised world from the local through the national 
and regional to the global; 
• the conviction that global democracy needs to target the social, cultural and ecologi-
cal re-embedding of global markets and bring the global economy under effective 
terms of political accountability; 
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• the need to reform the present day institutions of international political coordination 
to make them more representative, accountable and effective; 
• the distribution of a crucial role for global civil society networks in the process of 
global democracy; 
• the advocacy of some form of supranational political authority; 
• the conviction that global democracy requires the invention of a new type of com-
plex multi-level governance with new forms of interaction between institutional and 
non-institutional political actors. 
• most of the authors, with the only exception of Höffe, also agree that this shared vi-
sion of positive globalisation for reasons of political realism should not and for rea-
sons of democratic subsidiarity must not be conceived in terms of a world state. 
 The synthesis represented in the approach of the Open Method of Global Co-ordina-
tion, secondly, stresses in particular: 
• from the demarchy concept the basic ideas that the finality of global democracy 
needs to remain open and functional solutions to many of world democracy’s chal-
lenges are most promising; 
• from the cosmopolitan concept the twin ideas of an institutionalised cosmopolitan 
citizenship and the spread of supranational law; 
• from world republic concept not the principle of statehood as such but the idea of a 
basically subsidiary form of global governance that includes certain limited elements 
of statehood (law enforcement, courts); 
• from the traditional global governance approach the basic idea of an open multi-
pronged approach that needs to remain open to pragmatic correction and incremental 
growth.  
 At the core of an Open Method of Global Co-ordination are six strategic pillars, 
their internal democratisation and their function-based interaction: 
1. The concept of a rights and duty based cosmopolitan citizenship that entitles the 
individual citizen everywhere in the world to appropriate political action at the rele-
vant political level – local, national, regional or global – and participation in the re-
spective processes of deliberation and decision making. 
2. The democratisation, complementation, enhancement and increased effectiveness of 
existing transnational and supranational political institutions and organizations, es-
pecially the UN and its sub-organizations. Particularly the establishment of a Peo-
ple’s Chamber and an Economic World Security Council with powers of surveil-
lance, framework setting and intervention are necessary. 
3. The extension, intensification and internal democratisation of Regional systems of 
political co-operation such as the EU, ASEAN, SAARC, Mercosur, Nafta and the 
like and their networking as building blocks (Willy Brandt) of world democracy. 
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4. Stressing sector-wise functional global governance in relevant sub-systems such as 
Trade, Labour, Ecology, Health, Security etc. through building transnational regimes 
of sector-wise political regulation such as the Kyoto-Protocol, the World Labour 
Organization or the World Trade Organization and making them much more ac-
countable, inclusive and democratic.  
5. Giving the trans-national civil society support and additional politic weight with its 
more than 25 000 initiatives of today that cover all relevant policy fields from hu-
man rights and labour condition monitoring through environmental protection to 
gender equality etc. 
6. Building a global public sphere both to foster the emergence of and give expression 
to cosmopolitan citizenship as the original source of global democracy: its legiti-
macy and its forms and functions.  
 
 The Limited Role of Civil Society 
 The demarchy theorists argue that because of the irreparable alienation of the given 
political institutions from peoples’ aspirations, values and customs the main thrust for 
the necessary renewal of democracy in era of globalisation can only come from within 
civil society and be realized in its forms of organization and action (see also Barber, 
1995). This would, however, mean to overstretch the capabilities of civil society and 
underestimate the role of binding decisions, power and sanctions even for a democratic 
political world order. The economic and social powers that have to be tamed in order to 
re-embed world economy in accordance with social, cultural and ecological standards 
require powerful state-like instruments of political implementation. In a realistic con-
cept of democracy civil society cannot replace institutionalised statehood as such.  
 In the institutional dimension the role of civil society is indispensable but also 
clearly limited. It will have to play its crucial role in contributing to two particularly 
relevant functions of global democracy: first, defining the objectives and standards of 
global regulation and framework setting (re-embedding), and second, contributing to the 
monitoring and control of norm implementation in its capacity as part of what James 
Rosenau has called spheres of authority, i.e. clusters of experts, media, citizen’s initia-
tives, institutions that emerge around particular policy issues like child labour, environ-
mental destruction or the drugs trade (Zürn, 1998). In setting the goals of transnational 
regulation in a binding manner and in making their implementation work, more institu-
tionalised forms of authority such as transnational organizations and the national state 
acting on their behalf will have to play the decisive part in any realistic concept of 
global democracy. What is needed for erecting such a legitimate world order today is 
consensus and power of implementation.  
 As it seems that less and less people accept that the answers to the challenges from 
globalisation must be left to markets what is also needed are models and concepts for a 
good life in order to give global governance meaning and direction. This is, as far as I 
can see, the driving force behind those young people who resist the present mode of 
globalisation. It underlies large parts of the activities of civil society world-wide and 
also citizen’s movements in large parts of the developing world.  
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 If we speak about reflexive modernization as a new stage in the historical process of 
modernization (Beck, 1997; Giddens, 2000) we are well advised to use the term as a call 
both for norms and for tools in order to give modernization meaning and direction, not 
just to designate a new level of complexity within the structures and processes of mod-
ernization themselves. The key question in this respect is where shall the ethical norms 
and values come from that will allow us to make meaningful use of the tools for con-
trolling and shaping modernization? It is exactly at this junction that civil society proves 
to be an indispensable and crucial element of any meaningful concept of global democ-
racy. Though the role of civil society in implementing democratic control over the proc-
esses of modernization and globalisation is limited, its contribution to building the val-
ues and creating the solidarity necessary for making the values powerful are crucial. The 
social form in which the domination free public space of civil society can be made use 
of to meet these ends is direct dialogue between citizens.  
 Civil society can play a key role in both approaches to positive globalisation: 
governance and value-building. It is simultaneously one of the tools of democratic 
regulation and the only available social space in which that kind of free and open citi-
zens’ dialogues can take place that are able to generate ethical norms and political val-
ues. At the same time those direct dialogue initiatives that can be used and usually are 
conducted in civil society have the potential to create not only consensus about norms 
and values for shared forms of life, but also the energies of solidarity and social capital 
that are necessary for their implementation in everyday life and in the field of political 
action (Putnam, 2000).  
 
 Facing Reality: The New American Unilateralism 
 Unfortunately, having developed so much of utopian realism it could appear that all 
this is just in vain in confrontation with the emerging new reality of the US-super-power 
unilateralism. This political turn apparently serves as a powerful, persistent and discour-
aging roadblock on all the avenues towards democratic global governance in which of 
its form so ever. In its present shape it works to dismantle the very prospect of the uto-
pian realism of a world democracy based on multilateral co-operation and fairness. The 
incumbent US-administration has deliberately chosen to follow the strategic option of 
building a hegemonic unilateral political world order based on the twin pillars of a claim 
to posses a superior entitlement to world-wide legitimate action and on the brute reality 
of an absolutely superior military power.  
 The economic interests behind the Bush administration’s rhetoric of global peace-
keeping by a global war on terrorism are less visible but nonetheless of crucially im-
portance for its design. The uppermost issues on the hidden economic agenda seem to 
be the worldwide enforcement of a Washington-consensus based liberal economy and 
the strategic control of the world’s oil resources. The two generative ideas to legitimise 
the present unilateral strategic turn seem to be, first, the argument that only the US 
alone can guarantee security and peace in a stabile world order and, second, that do-
mestic support by the US public and electorate are in the final instance a sufficient 
source for legitimising the US-governments worldwide strategic actions.  
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 It seems that the present US-government to some degree can draw upon retrieved 
traditions from the early history’s political culture of the US (Haller, 2002). The basic 
motives of the new ideology lie in an insistence that as the redeemed nation the US is 
both entitled and obliged to be also the whole world’s redeeming nation. The incumbent 
US government acts under the impression that the majority support of the American 
voters who share this vision is a sufficient source of legitimacy in case other nations 
hesitate to join in. September 11 serves as a pragmatic proof that this strategy is without 
alternative in the world of today. There seems to be no space for multi-lateralism in the 
framework of this new thinking. Hence, all the projects for global democracy appear to 
be rendered obsolete in the light oft this strategic turn of the only acting super power 
against whose veto and interest not much could be achieved. The record of recent years 
with the US-administration’s denial of political co-operation in so many areas of secu-
rity and environmental policy seems to stand proof of this expectation argument.  
 Yet, as I would like to argue, it would be a deeply flawed approach both in analyti-
cal and political terms to read these new developments in the light of some renewed 
versions of old fashioned theories of completely economic-driven imperialism, let alone 
“Empire”. Though the economic interests behind the new US international policy may 
be strong and the cultural backing deep rooted there is no determinism at work here. 
The politics of earlier US-administrations and the emerging political opposition within 
the US itself demonstrate that what is at work today is a strategic political option of one 
coalition of interests to which there are alternatives that are not without chances in the 
near future. Students of the traditions of US foreign policy have argued, that both the 
scope for unilateral politics of the US-administration and of success for alternative op-
tions depend crucially upon the role the EU is going to take vis-à-vis the US and the 
global community. As David P. Calleo has put it: “It is not healthy for America’s own 
inner balance to have allies incapable of looking out for their own interests. If the trans-
atlantic balance is not restored by a strong EU, the United States will advance its uni-
polar fantasy, using its power to sustain its economy, and creating along the way the 
enemies it needs to fill its world view”(Calleo, 2002). 
  
 Feasible Prospects: Coalition for a New Multi-lateralism 
 The prospects for global democratisation thus depend upon the performance of the 
European Union and other relevant political actors in the global arena including new 
transnational political movements and their impacts on the US publics. From a realistic 
point of view there is a limited range of actors in the global political arena of today and 
tomorrow who can form a political coalition to promote the project of global democracy 
with sufficient measures of political support and power mobilization. Basically there are 
five candidates for such an alliance who have demonstrated in recent years that they will 
and can act – based on different but well-understood interests – to varying degrees in 
that direction:  
1. Large parts of the international civil society including the responsible currents in the 
so called “anti-globalisation”-movement. 
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2. The globalist majority among the world wide social democratic movement and the 
related family of political parties (as organized in the Socialist International) in-
cluding relevant currents among the US democrats. 
3. The emerging players in the systems of regional political co-operation. 
4. Some of the Third World countries and emerging new democracies.  
5. The political mainstream and the large majority of national governments in the 
European Union. 
 It must be added, however, that the parties of international Social Democracy have 
not yet reached at a consensus on their response to the new challenge of US-unilateral-
ism and neo-liberal globalisation. There is some probability that they never will in the 
foreseeable future. The large majority of the related parties, however, are – at least at 
the level of their programmatic liabilities – strongly in favour of global democratisation, 
global economic regulation, containing US-unilateralism and enhancing regional politi-
cal co-operation. Yet, the parties of Social Democracy in Europe are at present time to a 
certain degree trapped in a strategic dilemma. Whereas in their programmatic discus-
sions and commitments most of them endorse the idea that the extension, intensification 
and democratisation of democratic global governance is necessary in order to re-embed 
global markets under social and ecological standards they are much more hesitant when 
is comes to drawing practical consequences. At the level of action they usually meet 
with two major road blocs on their way. The first is the electoral situation that pushes 
social democratic parties to pursue the most immediate social and economic interests of 
their national electorate in the first instance. The other, once they are in office, consist in 
the necessity to come to workable arrangements with the dominance of the US-admini-
stration. From within their party organizations there is, nonetheless, constant pressure 
toward and in favour of global democracy and a fairer world order.  
 The European Union is the most promising actor capable of counterbalancing US-
unilateralismus effectively. Most of the member states are ready to move the Union’s 
foreign policy in that direction. Contrary to a widespread opinion the underdeveloped 
military strength of the Union is no serious obstacle of such a strategy because under 
consideration is not transatlantic confrontation but a more balanced transatlantic part-
nership in leadership that could lead to a more participative world order (Czempiel, 
2002). The US-administration could dare no major military intervention anywhere on 
the globe if the EU does not comply in practical terms by sharing the financial burden, 
making its infrastructure available for the US forces and providing a minimum of le-
gitimacy to it. It is in the vested economic, cultural and political interest of the EU to 
counterbalance US-unilateralism and work for the democratisation of the global order. 
The political model of the EU’s own way from the erstwhile politics of confrontation of 
its member states toward an ever denser co-operation between them may as such serve 
as a paradigm of successful transnational governance – a model in which sovereign na-
tion states retain their sovereignty and cooperate inter-governmentally where it makes 
sense but pool it and act supra-nationally where it proves necessary. The only condition 
that needs to be met is more unanimity in the EU’s foreign policy combined with an or-
ganizational reform that makes it easier for the EU to speak with one voice when it 
comes to its relations with the US. This is no unrealistic hope.  
 
Meyer, T., Renewing Democracy in ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 6–25 22 
                                                                                                                                              
 References 
Barber, Benjamin, 1995: Jihad vs. McWorld, New York 
Barber, Benjamin, 1998: A Place for us. How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong, New 
York  
Barber, Benjamin R., 2001: How to Make Society Civil and Democracy Strong, in: Giddens, 
Anthony (ed.): 269-279  
Bergounioux, Alain, 2001: French Socialism and European Social Democrarcy, in: Cuperus, 
Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 227-240 
Bertram, Christoph, 2002: Europe’s Best Interest: Staying Close to Number One. http://fesportal. 
fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE. 
HTM 
Bresser-Pareira, Luiz Carlos 2001: The New Left Viewed from the South, in: Giddens, Anthony 
(ed.): 358-371 
Burnheim, John, 1985: Is Democracy Possible?, Cambridge  
Brown, Gordon, 2001: Tackling Poverty. A Global New Deal. A Modern Marshall Plan for the 
Developing World, The Transport& General Workers Union, London 
Calleo, David P., 2002: Balancing America: Europe’s International Duties. http://fesportal.fes.de/ 
pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM 
Colome, Gabriel, 2001: Multiple Third Ways. The Spanish Case, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, 
Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 199-216 
Cuperus, René/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel. Johannes (eds.), 2001: European Social Democracy Facing 
the Twin Revolution of Globalisation and the Knowledge Society, Colofon, Amsterdam  
Cuperus, Rene, 2001: The New World and the Social – Democratic Response, in: Cuperus, René/ 
Duffek, Karl/ Kandel. Johannes (eds.):151-170 
Czempiel, Ernst-Otto, 2002: Europe’s Mission: pushing for a Participative World Order. 
http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EIN-
GANGSSEITE.HTM 
Dauderstädt, Michael, 2001: Ways, Byways and Third Ways to a Social and Democratic Europe, 
Friedrich- Ebert-Stiftung: Series Eurokolleg 44, Bonn 
Dryzek, J.S., 1995: Political and Ecological Communication, Environmental Politics, (4) 4: 13-30  
Edwards, Michael, 2001: Humanising Global Capitalism: Which Way Forward?, in: Giddens, 
Anthony (ed.), The Global Third Way Debate, Polity Press, Cambridge: 384-393 
Esping-Andersen, Gosta, 2001: A Welfare State for the 21st Century, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 
114-133 
Faulks, Keith, 2000: Citizenship, London 
Feindt, Peter Henning, 2002: Neue Formen der politischen Beteiligung, in: Meyer, Thomas/ Weil, 
Reinhard, Die Bürgergesellschaft. Perspektiven für Bürgerbeteiligung und Bürgerkommuni-
kation, Bonn 
 
Meyer, T., Renewing Democracy in ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 6–25 23 
                                                                                                                                              
Ferdinand, Peter 2000: Democratization, Good Governance and Good Government in Asia, In-
stitute for East Asian Studies/East Asian Politics, University of Duisburg 
Gaerlan, Kristina N. (ed.), 1999: Transitions to Democracy in East and Southeast Asia, Institute 
for Popular Democracy, Queson City (Phlippines) 
Galston, William A./ Kamarck, Elaine, 2001: Five Realities that will Shape 21st Century US Poli-
tics, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 100-110 
Gamble, Andrew/ Wright, Tony, 1999: The New Social Democracy, Cambridge 
Giddens, Anthony, 1990: The Consequences of Modernity, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Giddens, Anthony, 1994: Beyond Left and Right. The Future of Radical Politics, Polity, Cam-
bridge 
Giddens, Anthony, 1998: The Third Way. The Renewal of Social Democracy, Polity Press, Cam-
bridge 
Giddens, Anthony, 2000: The Third Way and its Critics. Polity Press, Cambridge 
Giddens, Anthony (ed.), 2001: The Global Third Way Debate, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Giddens, Anthony, 2002: Where Now for New Labour?, Polity Press, Cambridge 
Habermas, Jürgen, 1982: Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 Vls., Frankfurt/M.  
Haller, Gret, 2002: Die Grenzen der Solidarität. Europa und die US im Umgang mit Staat, Nation 
und Religion, Berlin 
Hardt, Michael/ Negri, Antonio, 2000: Empire, Cambridge/London 
Held, David, 1995: Democracy and the Global Order, Cambridge 
Held, David, 2001: Regulating Globalisation? The Reinvention of Politics, in: Giddens, Anthony 
(ed.): 394-405 
Held, David/McGrew, Anthony (ed.), 2000: The Global Transformations Reader. An Introduction 
to the Globalisation Debate, Cambridge 
Höffe, Otfried, 1999: Demokratie im Zeitalter der Demokratisierung, München 
Howe, Stephen, 2001: Travelling Theories and Multiple Third Ways, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, 
Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 77-92 
Kapstein, Ethan B., 2001: The Third Way and the International Order, in: Giddens, Anthony 
(ed.): 372-383 
Kelly, Gavin (ed.), 1999: The New European Left, Fabian Society, London 
Latham, Mark, 2001: The Third Way: An Outline, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 25-35 
Liddle, Roger, 2001: On New Labour, Neoliberalism and the Making of the Schröder-Blair 
Document, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 143-150  
Linklater, A., 1996: Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State, European Journal 
of International Relations, (2) 1: 77-103  
Marshall, Thomas H., 1992: Bürgerrechte und soziale Klassen. Zur Soziologie des Wohlfahrts-
staates, Frankfurt/New York 
 
Meyer, T., Renewing Democracy in ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 6–25 24 
                                                                                                                                              
Martenbauer, Markus, 2001: An Emancipatory Alternative to Neoliberalism, in: Cuperus, Rene/ 
Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 103-118 
McGrew, Anthony, 2000: Democracy beyond Borders, in: Held, David/ McGrew, Anthony (ed.): 
The Global Transformations Reader, Cambridge 
Merkel, Wolfgang, 2001: The Third Ways of Social Democracy, in: Giddens, Anthony (ed.): 50-
73 
Meyer, Thomas, 1993: Social Democracy. An Introduction, Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation, New 
Delhi 
Meyer, Thomas, 1998: Die Transformation der Sozialdemokratie. Eine Partei auf dem Weg ins 
21. Jahrhundert, Bonn 
Meyer, Thomas, 1999: From Godesberg to the Neue Mitte. The New Social Democracy in Ger-
many, in: Kelly, Gavin (ed.) 
Meyer, Thomas, 2001a: Identity Mania. Fundamentalism and the Politicization of Cultural Dif-
ference, Zed, London 
Meyer, Thomas, 2001b: Soziale Demokratie und Globalisierung. Eine europäische Perspektive, 
Dietz, Bonn 
Meyer, Thomas, 2002a: Soziale Demokratie und Globalisierung, Bonn 
Meyer, Thomas, 2002b: Was ist Politik. Eine aktuelle Einführung, 2nd ed., Opladen 
Meyer, Thomas, 2002c: Media Democracy. How the Media Colonize Politics, Oxford 
Meyer, Thomas/ Weil, Reinhard, 2002: Die Bürgergesellschaft. Perspektiven für Bürgerbe-
teiligung und Bürgerkommunikation, Bonn 
Owen, John M., 2002: Why American Hegemony is here to Stay. http://fesportal.fes.de/pls/ 
portal30/docs/FOLDER/POLITIKANALYSE/paxamericana/EINGANGSSEITE.HTM 
Pfaller, Alfred, 2000: Social Democracy in the Globalised Post-Industrial Society, Friedrich- 
Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn 
Putnam, Robert, 2000: Bowling Alone. The Collapse and Revival of American Community, New 
York 
Scharpf, Fritz, 2001: Employment and the Welfare State in the Open Economy, in: Cuperus, 
Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 63-76  
Stiglitz, Joseph, 2001: An Agenda for Development for the Twenty-First Century, in: Giddens, 
Anthony (ed.): 340-357 
Streeck, Wolfgang 1998: Einleitung, in: Internationale Wirtschaft und nationale Demokratie. 
Herausforderungen für die Demokratietheorie, Frankfurt/New York  
Svensson, Charlotte, 2001: Swedish Social Democracy and the Third Way – a Delicate Affair, in: 
Cuperus, René/ Duffek, Karl/ Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 217-226 
Szreter, Simon, 2001: A New Political Economy: The Importance of Social Capital, in: Giddens, 
Anthony (ed.): 290-299 
Telo, Mario, 2001: The European Dimension of the Third Way, in: Cuperus, Rene/ Duffek, Karl/ 
Kandel, Johannes (eds.): 171-186 
 
Meyer, T., Renewing Democracy in ..., Politička misao, Vol. XXXIX, (2002), No. 5, pp. 6–25 25 
                                                                                                                                              
The Commission on Global Governance, 1995: Our Global Neighborhood, Oxford 
Tinbergen, Jan, 1965: International Economic Integration, Second, revised edition, Amsterdam  
Zürn, Michael, 1998: Regieren jenseits des Nationalstaats. Globalisierung und Denationalisier-
ung, Frankfurt/M. 
